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Abstract
1 explore a principal-agent rclationahip in which the agent enjoya ex-
erting effort, and the principal appeala to the sgent's senae of joó
satiafaction. The principal cao either impoae a project, or delegate
the choice ofa project to the agent. The agent has to incur a cost for
learning hia ex ante unknown preferences among the projecta.The op-
timal delegation acheme ia determined by the tradeoff betwe~en more
diacretion (higher probability that the agent propoaea his preferred
project and exerta high eR'ort) and lesa diacretion (principal can im-
pase his preferred project). The priacipal can write a contract with a
third party (e.g. an inveator, or the firm's CEO) that makea commit-
ment to ehe delegation acheme credible.
Keyvwrdx: Ihlegalion, Empowermenl, Organizalions; JEL ClaxfriJioa-
tion: L23.
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1 Introduction
The principal-agent literature atudiea optimal rewazd atructures for an agent
who dislikea exerting effort (aee Hart and Holmstróm (7] for a survey). Typi-
cally in this literature, the principal either does not know the agent's produc-
tivity, or cannot obaerve how hard the agent is working (and it ia impossible
to make exact inferencea ex post by obeerving realized output or profita).
The principal's problem ia then to maximize profita by deaigning an opti-
mal "carrot," that is, a pecuniary incentive scheme that induces (given the
informational constraints) the agent to work as hard as posaible.
In this paper, I explore a principal-agent relationahip in which the agent
enjoys exerting effort (at least to some extent), and the principal may opti-
mally appeal to the agent's senae of job satisfaction (or more generally, the
agent's private benefita, as opposed to uaing pecuniazy rewards). Among a
number oí candidate projects, only one can be executed by the agent. The
principal can either impose a project, or delegate the choice of a project to
the agent. The agent's preferences among the projects are ex ante unknown,
and he has to incur a private coat in order to learn them. The principal can
motivate the agent to get informed by giving him reaponsibility to choose
among a Iarge enough number of projects. Since the agent ia intrinaically
motivated by private benefita, diacretion for the agent aleo benefits the prin-
cipal: the agent exerts maximsl effort on his pet project.'
Thus, the model analyzes empowerment of the agent in an agency rela-
tionahip. The following quote illustrates the main queation: "'fhe iseue [. .. ]
is where to draw the line around responsibilitiea and [. ..] freedom. I agree
that it's important to delegate responsibility and empower people through-
out the organization, but you also have to communicate clearly what the
boundaries are around their jobs." (Poole, in Continental Bank [3], p. 50.)
iThus, a special feature of the model u that initially there is eymmetric intormation
between the partia, and only the asent óas the ability to aequire iníormation euch that
an asyrtunetry is created. Hy delesating respooeibility, the principal can óive the agent
incentivm to create an eeymmetry of intormstioo.
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In the model, the principal selects an optimal delegation scheme for the
agent by evaluating the following tradeoff. On the one óand, giving the agent
little discretion in project choice resulta in a lack of initiative: the agent has
no incentive to learn his private benefita. The principal's moat preferred
project is implemented, but the agent exerts an intermediate level of effort.
On the other hand, much diacretion in project choice resulta in iaitiative: the
agent will get informed and recommend hia preferred project. The aelected
project may be auboptimal for the principal, but the agent exerta a maximum
level of effort.
In order to have an incentive to collect inform~ti4A~SÍLe ggent may need
an amount of discretion that is larger than the principal would give him if
getting informed would be costlesa. In this case the agent's proposal need
not be optimal ex poat, although the delegation acheme ia optimal ex ante.
Accordingly, it may happen that after receiving the agent's recommendation
for a project, the principal has an incentive to break hia promiae to follow up
the proposal. Aa was already noticed by Schelling [l l], a means to make com-
mitment posaible is to write a contract with a third party. Here, when profits
are contractable, profit-aharing with a third party (e.g. an inveator, or the
organization's CEO) can give the principal incentivea not to abuse his author-
ity after the agent's recommendation. It is ahown that a renegotiation-proof
contract with a third party, implying an incentive scheme for the principal,
can solve the credibility problem of the principal with regard to his agent.
The reason why the principal and the third party may refrain from rene-
gotiating ia that there is an informational asymmetry.~ At the time of rene-
gotiation (the interim stage), the principal knowa the agent's proposal, but
the investor doea not. The wntract turna out to be auch that the inveator
cannot infer the agent's recommendation at the interim atage. Hence the in-
vestor ia not aure whether there is aa allocative gain when renegotiating, or
the principal tries to realize a gain at the inveator's disadvantage. The con-
~Dewatripont [6] ahowed (in a model in which aa incumbent firm signe labour contracta
to deter entry) that if there exist informational aeymmetriee, writing a contract with a
third party may reeult in credible commitment.
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tract is renegotiation-proof (i.e., interim efficient, see Maskin and Tirole [9])
when the investor cannot gain in expectation from renegotiating.
My agency model postulates that intrinaic rewards (e.g. job satisfaction,
challenge, a sense of accompliahment and achievement) aze effective motiva-
tors. As argued by Dessler [5], "Few rewards are aa powerful as the sense
of accomplishment and achievement that come from doing a job that one
genuinely wanta to do [. ..],n (p. 254). Moreover, it may be that extrinaic
motivators (e.g. money) have little or an adverae effect. Actually, there is a
debate going on in the management literature in which performance-related
pay is under heavy fire.3 One of the basic objectiona is that "[. ..] workera aze
much more infiuenced by [. ..] the intrinaic interest of their work than by crasa
material rewards.n (The Economiat, January 29th 1994, p. 69.) Further-
more, besides that there are non-negligible costs of implementing payment
schemes, it is put forward that they may demotivate people. The intention
of this paper is not to participate in this debate, but instead to complement
the existing principal-agent literature by investigating how a principal can
motivate his aubordinate if pecuniazy incentive schemes aze too costly or
have no or little effect. An example is a reseazcher. If he ia fascinated by a
research topic, he will sutomatically work hard, probably much harder than
he would do on a project that doea not interest him. It ia then practically
impossible to make him work harder by designing a payment acheme contin-
gent on, say, the number of papers he writes (even when quality is verifiable).
An appendix demonstratea this more formally.
Related to this paper is Aghion and Tirole [1]. They study endogenous
separation of formal authority (the right to choose a project) and real author-
ity (the effective choice of a project). A principal and an agent each incur a
cost to get informed about his own private benefits of a number of projects,
and only one pcoject can be chosen. Their preferences may not be aligned.
~, The principal can credibly delegate real authority to the agent by not having
incentives to get informed himself. In this case the agent's incentivea to get
9See tor inatance Kohn [B], and the referencea to empirical evidence cited therein.
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r. ~
informed increase,. but the principal's fóymal authority decreasea. An alter-
native way to give the agent an incentive to learn the projecta' payoffa is
to "make the agent his own bosa," that is, allocate formal authority to the
agent by disintegration.
The differences with Aghion and Timle (1] are firat, in my model the
principal's concern is the amount of discretion that he ahould delegate to
the agent, instead of whether he should get informed himself, or split up the
firm. Second, after selection of a project, the principal's payoffa depend on
how hard the agent works. Thus, giving the agent discretion alleviatea two
mocal hazard problems: it creates initiative to get informed and recommend
a project, and iL induces high effort.
Athcy et al. ['l] analyze the allocation o[ dccisions (e.g. about the pro-
duction volume) among two agenta (e.g. a foreman and a manager), in an
organization that faces uncertainty (e.g. concerning demand conditions and
defective output of machinea). In different states of the world, the agenta dif-
fer in their relative decision-making effectiveness (due to for inatance differ-
ences in talent, but also because the quality of an agent's decision ie reduced
as the number of states over which he has diacretion increases). In the firat
stage of the model, a subset of the posaible statea has to be chosen; in the
second stage, a state is realized by nature and a deciaion must be made. If
the state is in that set, then the foreman makes the deciaion; otherwiae, the
manager decides.' The allocation of diacretion is choaen in order to maximize
the ovcrall organization's benefits. Beaidea the different focus of their paper
(the allocation ot discretion under uncertainty), a major difference with my
model is that Athey et al. do not consider incentive problems between a
principal and an agent.
The model is presented in the following section. The principal's delega-
tion decision is analyzed in aection 3. The commitment problem (if any) ia
investigated in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludea. An appendix demon-
~'Chus one can distinguish between "hands-oN" menagement (or "rnanagement by ex-
ception") and "meddleaome" management, ae determined by the number of etatee of the
world in which the manager makea the decieion.
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strates why it may be much more effective to appeal to the agent's intrinsic
motivation rather than use pecuniary rewards.
2 The Organization
Consider a hietatchy (or organization) that consists of a principal called P,
and an agent called A. The hierarchy can implement only one out of n~ 2
possible projects. The principal's role is to either pick a project or delegate
the choice of a project to the agent. Once a project has been selected, the
agent executes (or implements) it.
The principal's benefits of project k, which will alao be called profita, are
denoted by 17k(e), where e~ 0 is the agent's effort in executing the project.
The efiort of the agent may be observable, and even verifiable. However, it
will not be included in a contract (see below).
Assumption 1 IIk(e) (i~ is decreasing in k, jor all e; (ii~ is strictly incnas-
ing in e, Jor all k; and (iii) satisfies IIk(e) ) 0, jor all k and e 1 0.
Thus for a given effort level, the principal's preferred project is project 1.
Also, all the projects are profitable.
The agent derives benefits U(6k, e) ~ 0 from project k, where bk denotes
his private benefits of project k, and e~ 0 is again his effort level. Private
benefits are directly related to a project (intrinsic rewards), and may include
job satisfaction, challenge, and a sense of accomplishment and achievement.
However, one can also think of perks on the job, the acquisition of professional
experience, career concerns, and so on.
Assumption 2 U(b, e) (i) is strictly incneasing in 6, jor all e; (ii) is strictly
concave in e, jor all 6; nnd (iii) satisftes ~ea~` 1 0.
By assumption 2(iii), the agent's optimal effort level is increasing in the level
of his private benefits.
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Nature selects 6~, ..., 6~„ according to a distribution Pr(6; - 6 and 6~ -
6, tJj ~ i) - a;, where ~; ~; - 1 and 6 ~ 6 1 0. Thus thete is one most-
preferred project for the agent; he is indifferent among the other projects.5
'1'he realization o( A's private benefits can only be obaerved by A. How-
ever, he has to incur a private cost F ~ 0 to do so. Whether A gets informed
is assumed to be unverifiable. Fot instance, a scientist, whose private benefits
depend on the originality of his work, has to chooae among research topics.
He can get informed by going through recent literature to see which project
is the most promising onee
I investigate how the agent can be induced to exert effort by allowing
him to enjoy private benefits. To simplify the analysis, it will be asaumed
that the agent receives a constant wage equal to his reservation wage, which
is normalized to zero. One can justify this aesumption in different ways.
First, money may be a bad motivator. For instance, the agent ia infinitely
risk averse to income. Second, a fixed wage may be imposed externally. For
example, the hierarchy is part of a larger organization in which the CEO
finds it too costly to condition salaties on all poasible contingenciea that
occur "way down" in the hierarchy. It may also be that fixed wages are
due to labor union influence. Consequently, the agent's effort level will not
be included in a contract.~ As argued in an appendix, abstracting from
pecuniary incentive schemes does not affect generality when the agent is
relatively more responsive to intrinaic motivation than to extrinsic incentives.
The principal's delegation deciaion is expressed by a mechanism (xr, .. ., x„),
where x; E[0,1] for all i- 1,...,n. If A recommends project k, then this
project will be implemented witó probability xk, and project 1 will be im-
SThia asaumption simplifiea the analyais; it is not crucial for the reeulta.
aAlternatively, F ia the coet of scanning the Iabor market for career opportunitiee: once
the agent has incurred F, he immediately eeea which project he prefere. The fact that F
ía independent of the number of projecta simplifiea the analyeie without loee of generality.
~If the agent reaponded to monetary incentives, the principal could increaee the agent's
incentivea ( i) to obaerve hie private benefite and recommend a project, and (ii) to exert
efl'ort (aee alao Aghion and Tirole [1]).
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plemented with probability 1- xk. So
xt - Pr(project k is implemented ~ A proposed project k).
For instance, x~ - 1 and xz - ... - x„ - 0 corresponds to P imposing his
preferred project, that is, project 1. If xr -...- x„ - 1 then A has complete
responsibility: any project that A recommends will be implemented.s
The timing of the game is as follows:
t- 0: Nature selects A's private benefita, unobserved by P and A. P chooses
x; E [0,1], i- 1, ..., n, and communicates ( x~, ..., x„) to A.
t- 1: A decides whether to learn his private benefits (at cost F).
t- 2: A recommends a project k to P.
t- 3: Project k ia selected with probability xt, and project 1 is selected with
probability 1- xt. Subaequently, A picks an effort level e to execute
the selected project.
An additional assumption will be made in order to make the analysis
non-trivial:
Assumption S(i) Ij(xl,...,x~) -(1,0,...,0) then A decides not to learn
his private benefits, and
(ii) iJ ( x~, ... ,x„) -(1, ...,1) then A decides to learn his prYVate óeneftts.
Examplea. Consider benefit functions IIk(e) - p(e)Bk, and U(b,e) -
p(e)b - e. The values of the projects to P satisfy B~ ~... ~ B„ ~ 0.
Futhermore, p(.) is increasing and concave, p(0) - 0 and lim~.-,~p(e) - 1.
Three interpretations are:
1. Pnoduction: The agent realizes the production, and derives private
benefits from producing a particular product. The principal sells the
sMore generally, one could define zt; - Pr(project i is impkmented ~ A propoeed k).
A delegation echeme would then be a matrix (xl,...,~,), where zt -(zti,...,zt~)'.
One can verify that the optimal delegation scheme would satiefy zt; - 0 for all i~ 1, k.
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product. Bk is the willingness to pay for a product of type k by a
potential customer, given that it completely meets her wishes. In this
context p(e) denotes product quality. Accordingly, producing a"per-
fectn producL (p(c) - 1) is extremely coatly for the agent, and the client
is willing to pay p(e)Bk for a pmduct of quality p(e).
2. Marketing: The agent performs marketing activities for an exiating
product, and derives private benefita from being active in a particular
market. Bk denotes the aize of market k(all conaumers, in each market,
have a reservation price 1 for the product). Here p(e) is the fraction of
the market that is reacbed as a result of exerting marketing effort e.
3. RF1D: The agent is the researcher, and derives private benefita from
realizing a particular innovation. An innovation of type k has patent
value Bk. Given an effort level e, an innovation k occurs with proba-
bility p(e).
3 Optimal Delegation
'1'o begin with, some additioaal notation is introduced. Let é e arg max~ U(b, e)
(the agent's optimal effort level for a high private-benefits project), e-
arg max~ U(b, e) (optimal effort for a low private-benefits project), and eo -
arg max~{a;U(6, e) f(1 - a;)U(4, e)} (optimal effort when the agent is unin-
formed about project i's private benefits). Furthermore, denote u- U(6, é),
u- U(6 e), and ua - a;U(b,eo) -~ (1 - a;)U(ó,eo). Note that by asaump-
tion2,éleo]eanduluo~~foralli.
Assumption 3 can equivalently be written as
F-a~u~-(1-a~)u-u~ cF Lu-uÍ-F, (1)
that is, the cost of learning private benefits ia suf6ciently high so that A
does not care about observing 6~ if project 1 is imposed, and the coat is
suf5ciently low so that he has an incentive to obaerve his private benefits if
he has complete discretion.
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The equilibrium of the game is calculated by backwazd induction. Sup-
pose that project k is selected at t- 3. Two ca.4ea can be distinguiahed:
(i) A knows the value of 6k. If 6k - b then A exerta effort é. If 6k - 4 then
A exerts effort e.
(ii) A does not know the value of 6k. He exerta effort ek.
At t- 2, A recommends a project. Given that 6e did not obaerve his
private benefita, I will assume that he acts in P's interest and recommends
project 1(this will be the case if al ~ a~ for all j- 2, .. .,n).9 Thia ia
equivalent to giving A the posaibility to make no recommendation, after
which P will pick his preferred project. If A knowa his private benefita,
then he recommends project k if and only if 6k - b. Thus the incentive
compatibility constrainta are trivially satiafied.
Setting xl - 1(note that this does not impose any reatrictions), A will
learn his private benefits at t- 1 if and only if
n




~~kxk(11 - f1) i F-~ t1~ - tl. (i)
k-1
The principal's delegation problem at t- 0 can be aplit into two problems.
The first one is the optimal choice of (xl, ..., x„), denoted by (xi, ... , x;,),
given that A learna hia private benefita:
n
max ~ Uklxk~k(é) f (I - xk)~1(e)1r,.....rn
k-1
S.t. ~k-1 CYkxk(1L - 1t) i F~ t~j -]Ei
0 G x; c l,i - 1,...,n.
(3)
9This asaumption eimplifies the exposition without laes of generality.
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The second problem is the optimal choice of (xl,...,x„), denoted by




8.t. ~k-1 D:kxk(u - U) ~ F~ 1t0 - tL,
0 C x; G l,i - 1,...,n.
Let II'"~ denote the optimal value of problem ( 3). The implicit form of
its solution is given in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1 Pnoófem (3) is solroed by a delegation scheme ( xi, ..., xr) -
(1, . . . , 1, x~, 0, . . . , 0), Jor some x'i E [0,1] and C E {2, . . . , n} such that (2J
holds vrith equality if IIi(é) C II1(e).
Proof: Problem ( 3) can be solved in a simple way (optimality of the derived
solution can be verified immediately with the Duality Theorem of linear
programming). P will select xi - 1, because IIl(é) 1 IIl(e). Moreover, since
IIk(é) - IIl(e) is decreasing in k, there exists an m E{1,...,n} such that
II;(é) ~ IIl(g) for all i - 1,...,m,
and
II;(é)~IIl(g)foralli-mfl,...,n.
Accordingly, P sets a; - 1 for all i- 1, ...,m. There are two posaibilities:
(i) Inequality ( 2) is satisfied if x; - 0 for all i- m~ 1, ..., n. The problem
is solved.
(ii) Inequality (2) is not satiefied if x; - 0 for all i- m~ 1,...,n. By
assumption 3(ii), there exists an L E{m f 1,...,n} such that (2)
holds if x; - l, i- m-}. 1, . .., l and x; - 0, i - l f 1, ..., n. However,
since setting x; ~ 0 is ex post costly for P if A recommende a project
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i E {m -F 1, ... , e}, P will set x'~ E (0,1~ such that ( 2) ia binding, that
19,
, F-Fu~-~-~~-i~~(u-u)
x~ - ~t(u - u)
Accordingly, the problem is aolved. O
(5)
The intuition behind lemma 3.1 is as follows. If A, who is informed about
his private benefits, recommends a project k with Hk(é) 1 III(g), then the
proposal will be accepted by P. In this case P cares more about A's effort
than about his own preferences when comparing project k with project 1.
However, in order to give A an incentive to obaerve his private benefita, it
may be necessary that P also accepta some "bad" projecta, that is, projects
for which Ilk(é) G HI(e). Of courae, P will accept as few bad projecta as
possible: A is given no rnore incentivea than necessary, that is, (2) holds with
equality (given that it ia optimal for P to include some bad projects in A's
choice set).
By asaumption 3, problem (4) is trivially solved by giving A no discretion,
tllat is, (xo, ..., x~) - (1, 0, ..., 0). Accordingly, the agent has no incentive
to learn his private benefits.
The solution of P's problem at t- 0, denoted by (xi, ..., x;,), ia found
by comparing the valuea of II'"~ and IIl(eo). In particular, the reaponaibility
delegated by the principal to the agent satisfies
- r x;, i- 1,...,n if H'"1 ~ III(eo),x; Sl
xo, i - 1,...,n otherwise.
Delegating responsibility only makes sense if II'"~ ? III(ea), that is, it is
(expectedly) profitable. In this caee, P waats A to get informed. The analysis
is summarized in the following propoaition.
Proposition S.1 (i) IjH'"1 ? III(eo) then P selects a delegation scheme
( 1, ...,1, x'~, 0, .. ., 0) jor some l 1 2 (see lemma 3.1); A vrill learn his prYVate
óenefits and propose his preJerred prioject.
12
(ii~ ijn'"~ G H~(eo) then P selects delegationscheme (1,0,...,0); P imposes
his pmjerred ptnject and A wil! not learn his private benefits.
The intuition behind proposition 3.1 is straightforward. When selecting
A's optimal delegation acheme, P faces a tradeoff between giving A more or
less discretion. Little discretion in project choice results in a lack of initiative:
A has no incentive to learn hia private benefits. P's most preferred project ia
implemented, but A exerts an intermediate level of effort. Much diacretion
in project choice results in initiative: A will learn hia private benefits and
recommend his preferred project. The selected project may be suboptimal
for P, but A exerts a maximum level of effort.
Accordingly, authoritive management has the effect of demotivating the
agent. On the other hand, the conaequences of empowerment of the agent (or
"hands-off" management) are that. the agent's incentives ( i) to get informed
and make a proposal, and (ii) to work hard on the propoeed project increase.
For an expositional purpose, one can define the agent's amount of discre-
tion as
X - n (21 f .. . ~ xn)'
Notice that X E [,'-,,1]. Accordingly, a higher level of X corresponda to more
responsibility for A. We have that X- ~ correponds to no diacretion, and
X- 1 to total freedom.
What role does the agent's coet of getting informed play? If (2) is not
binding, which is typically the case for low values ot F, a small increase in F
has no influence on X. By inspettion of (5) it followa that for larger values
of F, consttaint ( 2) is binding and X ia atrictly increasing in F. This reflects
that A may need more diacretion to have an incentive to learn hia private
benefits. However, this is only true as long as H'"~ does not drop below
11~(eo). An increase in !' that is sufficiently large will result in H'"~ G H1(eo),
so that A loses all his responaibility. Let this threahold level of F be denoted





Figure 1 Empoweiment (X ) and the cost oj getting informed (F).
Example 3.1 Let IIk(e) - p(e)Bk, and U(6, e) - p(e)6 - e, where Bl ~
... 1 B" ~ 0, p(-) ia increasing and concave, and satiafies p(0) - 0 and
lim~~m p(e) - 1. 7'here are three possible projecta. Suppose that F-
(c~~ -F ~s)u f a3u - uo and p(é)Bs C p(e)B~.
Straightforward calculations yield that ( xi,xz,s3) - ( 1,1,0) and II'"~ -
a~p(é)B~ -F osp(é)Bz -~ a3p(g)B~. Furthermore, (so,xz,z3) -( 1,0,0) and
If~(ea) - p(eo)B~. lf a~p(é)Bi f a~p(é)B~ ~ a3p(g)B~ ? p(eo)Bl then the
optimal delegation scheme is (x„x~,x3) -(1,1,0). Accordingly, the agent
finds it worthwile to learn the private benefits of the different projects, so
that he can recommend his preferred project.
In the analysis above it was implicitly asaumed that the principal can com-
mit himself to a delegation acheme. To see why this asaumption is needed,
consider example 3.1 and suppose P is not able to commit himself. Let
p(é)B~ G p(g)Bl, that is, if the agent recommenda project 2, the principal ex
post prefers project 1. However, the optimal scheme (x„ x„ x3) -(1,1, 0)
suggests that the agent's recommendation will be followed up by the princi-
pal. Thus there ia a time-conaistency problem. The following reault follows
from inspection oí problem (3):
Proposition 3.2 IJ P cannot commit himselJ to jollow up the agent's rec-
ommendation, then only delegation schemes (xi,...,x;,) that satisfy xk 1
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0 q IIk(é) ? II~(e) are cnedible. Accordingly, crsdible commitment may be
necessary jor delegation of responsibility.
It is obvioua that lack of commitment may hurt both the principal and the
agent. In example 3.1, without conunitment, only the "no delegationr acheme
(xi, xz, x3) -(1, 0, 0) is credible. Accordingly, the principal's expected profits
are fI~ (eo), lower than the expected profits II'"~ that could be obtained under
commitment. It is easy to construct examples in which the agent atrictly
prefers to have enough diacretion so that he will get informed.
The higher is the agent's cost of getting informed, F, the more discretion
the agcnt needs to havc an incentive to take initiative. There[ore it will
be clear that (in general) commitment problems are more severe when F is
higher.
4 Credible Commitment
In this section I will assume that the principal cannot commit himself to
carry out a promise that is suboptimal ex poat. If a court could enforce
delcgation achemes, there would be no problem: given a proposal k while
xk - 1, the agent would never agree on implementing a project i~ k.
Thus, the principal has a credibility problem only if a court cannot prevent
the principal from forcing the agent to implement a certain project. The
purpose of this section is to find a solution to this credibility problemlo given
that the principal cannot rely on a court to protect the agent's diecretion
(a possible justification ís that project implementation is not verifiable by
outsidere). Indeed, casual empirical observation suggesta that if a principal
fails to comply with an earlier promise, the agent often has no power to react.
~oAn obvioua edution is to give the principal the poaeibility to build up a reputation for
following up recommendationa. Accordingly, if eome project k with Rt(é) ~[li(eJ is pro-
poeed by A, P facee a tradeoft betwcea: (i) impaeing the superior project 1 and decreaeing
A's tuture incentivea to recommend projects, and (ii) following up the recomnxndation
and increaeing A'e tuture incentivee to recommend projecte. Sce Tirok [13], chapter B, for
a aurvey of the theory ot repeated interaction.
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Suppose that the principal has the possibility to aign a contract on profit
sharing with a risk-neutral third party, called S(e.g. an investor, or the orga-
nization's CEO). The main question is then whether the optimal delegation
scheme when commitment is poasible (as derived in the previous aection) can
be implemented. The contract with S ahould give the principal incentivea to
carry out a delegation scheme after any proposal by the agent.
Throughout thia section it will be asaumed that II'"~ 1 IIl(eo), and that
there exiats at least one project k auch that xk ~ 0 and IIk(é) G II1(e).
Also, n~ 3 will be needed. By propoaition 3.2, there is a time-conaistency
problem: if A recommenda such a project k, P hae an incentive to break his
promise by imposing project 1.
'I'he organization's profits are assumcd to be contractable. AL the time
of delegating responsibility to A, P has the possibility to write a contract on
profit-sharing with S. S is not. able to verify which project ia implemented
(since he cannot observe or verify implementation), so that the choice of a
project ia noncontractable. I asaume that S is willing to aign any contract
that gives him non-negative net payoffa. An explanation ia that S competes
in a Bertrand fashion with other agenta.
What kind of contracta with a third party can one think of? A posaible
interpretation ia that S is an inveator who purchasea a financial contract.
For instance, the principal may isaue shares with the particularity that the
dividend percentage variea with the realized profita (as we will see later). An
alternative interpretation is that S ia the firm's CEO, that is, the principal's
principal.
A's project recommendation is private information for P. One can think
of a situation in which S doee not communicate with people on the workfloor,
and vice versa. For instance, if S is an inveator thia aituation correaponds
to casual empirical observation. A possible explanation ia that the costa
for workers and inveatora to find and subaequently get in touch with one
another are too high (see also footnote 15). Alternatively, if S is the CEO,
he may simply have no time to talk with the principal's subordinate because
of overload. Consequently, there is only communication between A and P,
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and between P and S.
S's payoffs oi the contract, as a function of profits, are denoted by D(Tf)
for an ossihle irofit, lFVel T( E V- fI, e ~""". l will assume that thereY P f { ( )}~-a.`
i~ liniiti,d liability fur 1' anrl S. 'I'hc prir.c at which P sclls thc ~xmtract is
denoted by p? 0 (so formally, a contract consiats of a profit-sharing rule as
a function of profita, and a price p). For example, p is the price of a financial
contract. Ii a contract is sold, p is added to any future profits.lt Thus we
have
o~D(n)sflfp, drfEV. (s)
Let (x~,...,xn) be the optimal delegation scheme under the assumption
that commitment is possible ( as derived in the previoua section). The purpose
of selling a contract is to align P's ex ante and ex poat incentives. Since
P cares about profits after paying S, the following incentive-compatibility
constraint must be satisfied. For all k that satisfy xk ~ 0 and IIk(é) G IIl(e):
nk(é) - D(nk(é)) ? n~(e) - D(ni(e)). (7)
The contract with S will be required to be renegotiation-proof. At the
renegotiation atage, S makes P a take-or-leave-it offer. This assumption
plays a simplifying role: signaling problems and multiplicity of equilibria are
avoided because S's proposal does not reveal any information.~~ Thus S has
full bargaining power at thia atage, but P can always inaist on sticking to
the initial contract (because it is binding). The purpose of renegotiating is
to have P impose project 1 after any recommendation k with IIk(é) G II~(e)
by A.
The contract will be called renegotiation-proof if and only it is interim
efficient. The payoffs specified by a contract aze interim efficient (relative to
~~For instance, the principal can put p on s bank account without acceae until profits
are realiaed. Moreover, I aeeume that 6e has no other reeources to put into mcrow.
~~Maskin and Tirole ~9j have ehown that if "strong" renegotiatioa proofneee ie the appro-
priate definition ot renegotiation proofnees, then it does not matter who has the bargaining
power at the renegotiation etage, i.e., the set of ez ante implementsbk allocations when
the uninformed party has all the bargsining power ie the eame when the informed party
has full bargaining power.
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the prior beliefs) if (i) they are incentive compatible, and (ii) there exista no
other incentive cornpatihle allocation thaL Pareto dominatea it, and yielda .S
at least as much expected utility (Maskin and Tirole [9]).
S's renegotiation offer consiata of a menu of new contract payoffa (to
replace the old payoffs D(II))
{d~(n)}nev , i - 1,...,n,
where i denotes P's announcement of A's recommendation. By the R.ev-
elation Principle, restricting S's offer to a direct-revelation mechanism ia
without loss of generality.13
We have the following timing:
t- 0: P sells a contract to S at price p, with payoffs specified as a function
of profits. This contract is obaerved by A. Nature selecta A's private
benefits. P communicatea (xl, ..., x;,) tc A.
t- 1: A decidea whether to learn his private benefita (at cost F).
t- 2: A recommends a project to P.
t- 3: S proposes P to renegotiate.
t- 4: P accepts or rejects S's offer, and executes the correaponding delega-
tion scheme. A picks an effort level to implement the selected project.
Profits are realized and the contract between P and S is executed.
To keep the analysis as simple as possible without hurting the insíghts, I
will focus on the case n- 3 auch that if commitment was poasible, P would
select (xi, x~, x3) -(1,1, 0), while II~(é) G IIl(e) (cf. example 3.1). The
following propoaition identifiea the set of renegotiation-proof allocations.
Propoaition 4.1 The contract between P and S is renegotiation-pnoof if and
only iJ
D(ni(e)) - D(n~(~)) ? ~~ } 03 (ni(e) - ns(é)) ~a3
(g)
13See for inetance Myetaon [10].
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Proof: I will say that the principal has type k if project k was recommended
by the agent. The only relevant incentive-compatilibity constraint for the
iuitial contract's payo(~s is"
11,(~) - D~ns(é)) ? n~(e) - D(ni(e)). (9)
Since there is no allocative gain ex post and no incentive problem if the agent
recommends project 1, any proposal by S satisfiea dr(IIl(é)) - D(IIr(é)).
Moreover, the proposal is incentive compatible if and only if
d - ds(n~(g)) - da(n~(g))- (10)
To see this, suppose that ( 10) does not hold. It is immediate that type
j- argmax~-z,3d~(II;(e)) would mimic the other type.
It must be that (9) holds with atrict inequality. If this were not the case,
tfien S could propose d- D(II~(é)) .} II;(e) - IIz(é) and gain in expectation
aZ(II;(g) - [I~(é)). Since II;(g) - d- IIz(é) - D(II~(é)), the offer would be
accepted by P.
Suppose that type 2 accepts S's offer, that is,
II;(g) - d 1 IIz(é) - D(ns(é)).
Since ( 9) holds with strict inequality, this in turn implies that type 3 also
accepts. So necessarily, by proposing to renegotiate, S runs the risk that he
is dealing with type 3 instead of type 2. Interim efficiency means that S is
not willing to take this gamble. There does not exist an incentive-compatible
allocation such that S is strictly better off in expectation compared to the
initial allocation if and only if for all d G D(IIz(é)) f IIl(e) - IIz(é):
aiD(ni(é)) f~~D(ns(é)) f~3D(nl(g)) ?~tdt(II,(é)) f azd f a3d.
Equivalently,
D(nr(e)) - D(ns(é)) ? a~ } 03 (nr(e) - ns(~)) . O~3
"Other incentive-compatibility conetrainta can trivially be satiafied; eee the proof of
proposition 4.2.
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The b-ic idea of the aroof of aroposition 4.1 is to ahow the following.
Suppose S makes a proposal to renegotiate. If P accepts when A has pro-
posed project 2 ( this is the only case in which there are mutual gains from
renegotiation for P and S), then necessarily he also accepts the renegotiatíon
offer when A has recommended project 3. Moreover, S is not able to make
an offer such that he ia able to diatinguish between project proposals 2 and
3.15 This means that renegotiating is "risky" for S, in the sense that the
fact that P accepts his offer is not informative about whether the "size of
the pie" can be increased. R.enegotation-proofneas amounts to designing the
initial contract such that the expected loss of renegotiation for S outweighs
- ..
the expected gain.
One can interpret ( 8) directly by rewriting it as
~a(T(1-ls(é)) - TÍ~~(e))~ ~ as~rli(e) - n2(é)~, (11)
where T(lI) - II- D(II) for all II E V, that is, T(.) denotes profits after
paying S. Inequality (11) says that the "expected bribe" to be offered to
the principal by S(in order to make him accept the renegotiation offer)
exceeds the expected gains that can be divided after the agent's proposal to
implement project 2 is not followed up.
Observation of inequality (8) sheds some light on the role of the prior dis-
tribution of A's private benefita. The lower bound for D(II~(g)) - D(II~(é))
(as given by the renegotiation-proofness requirement) is increasing in az,
the probability that A prefers project 2: the interim-efficiency constraint
isDirect communication between the agent and the third party would not help the latter.
If the agent could commit himaelf not to talk with S, he would certainly do eo, becauae
renegotiation ia bad for him. Bowever, suppoae the agent cannot wmmit, and S triea
to vetify the principal's announcemeat by aeking the a6ent about hia preferred project.
The only way tor S to make the agent reveal hia preferencee ie to promiae to implement
the agent's preferred project with paeitive probability (inatead of adopting delegation
acheme (1,0,0)). But then, once the agent hae revealed, S no longer has an incentive to
carry out such a randomisation. Indeed, aasuming that S ie abk to commit himaelf to
carry out suboptimal promieee, and not able to commit not to renegotiate, would at least
be vety queationable.
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becomes more stringent if the probability that there are gains from renegoti-
ating increases. Additionally, the interim-efirciency constraint becomes less
stringent if ~3 increases, that is, the expected cost of renegotiation increases.
Now that the renegotiation-proof allocations are identified, the princi-
pal's problem of optimal contract design can be formulated. In the following
program, the last three constrainta are incentive-compatibility conatraints.
Notice that ( 8) implies that if A proposes project 2, P has no incentive to





]r f ~ ~k~Rk(é) - D(~k(e))~ (12)
k-1
~ ~3 ~nl(e) - D(nl(e))~
s.t. arD(ni(é)) f~~D(ns(é)) f~3D(nr(e)) ? P,
D(nr(e)) - D(ns(é)) ? o o, (nr(e) - n~(é)),
OGD(II)~fltp, b'I1EV,
p 1 0,
iT~(é) - D(n~(e)) ? rI - D(n), n-11~(e),n3(e),
Ih(é) - D(ns(é)) ? na(!-) - D(n3(e)),
nr(~) - D(nr(g)) ? rt - D(n), rI - n~(g), n3(e).
Does there exist a solution to program (12) such that S's participation
constraint (the first constraint in the program) is binding? A direct obser-
vation is that P's expected profits equal II'"~ if and only if the contract's
expected net returns are zero (because any returns come from realized prof-
its). The answer to the question, which is the main result of thia section, is
given in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2 Thene exists a renegotiation-pnoof contmct with price p'
and returns D'(II), `d II E V, such that (i) (xi, xz, x3) -(1,1, 0) is imple-
mented, (ii) S punchases the contmct, and (iii) P's expected p~nfits are equal
t0 II'"~.
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Proof: Let. I)'(111(i )) - 111(c), D'(Ilz(r')) - 0, and U'(111(c')) -
1t"~(III(r) - Ilz(r)). Choosc p' such Lhat .S's participation constrainL is
Linding, i.e., P' - alll)(e) ~(az f a,I)(Ill(e) - Ilz(e)). lt is atraightfor-
ward Lo chcck that, all t.hc constraints of prograrn (12) are satisficd. Triv-
ially, !'s profits equal ~rIII(é) t oznz(é) - }. a3I1,(e) - II'"~. 'I'o complete,
D'(II) - fI -f p' for II E{IIz(e), II3(é), II3(e)} satisfy the limited liability
constraints and also the remaining incentive compatibility constraints. ~
By proposition 4.2, P can credibly commit himself to the optimal dele-
gat.ion scheme that induces A to get informed. Selling a renegotiation-proof
contract to an outside party convinces the agent that he can rely on the dele-
gation scheme. Moreover, since the expected return stream of the contract is
equal to its price, the principal is not worse off compared to the case in which
('OIIIIIIILfne11L was sirnply assumed to be possíblc. Rasically; Lhe analysia ex-
Illaim a nlanagcr's inca,utivc schclnc as a solution Lo a crcdibility prohlem of
Lho managcr with regard Lo his subordinatc.
In ineyuality ( 11) one can observe that thc principal's net profit function
resulting from the contract with the third party, T(II), is necessarily non-
monotonic. Therefore, one has to assume that the principal has no possibility
to "throw away" profits IIr(e)-IIz(é). A justification for such an assumption
is that wasting money may be easily detected and punished.
When profit-watiting activities are difficult Lo discern, the non-monotonicity
property of the principal's net profit function may be unappealing. However,
one should keep in mind that the purpose of the contract with the third
party is to create congruence of Lhe principal's and the agent's incentives.
In a more elaborate model, one can imagine that the principal cares about
the agent's job sat.isfaction ( the "smile on the agent's face"). Congruence
may then be achieved by a low-powered incentive scheme, such as T(II) - c
for all II. Thus low-powered incentives may be preferred over high-powered
incentives in firms for reasons of incentives-alignment.1e
IsWilliamson [14] identifies different motives for using low-powered incentive schemes in
firms he argues that high-powered incentives may give rise to asset utilization losses and
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5 Conclusion
ln this paper I investigate a principal-agent relationship in which the principal
gives Lhe agent an incentive to exert effort by considering the latter's private
benefits (e.g. job satisfaction). The principal can do so by giving the agent
responsibility to select a project (among a certain number of projects). If the
agent has enough discretion, he finds it worthwile to learn his private benefits
of the possible projecta, and recommend his preferred one. Delegation of
responsibility may benefit the principal because the agent will work hard if
he is allowed to implement his preferred project.
The principal can solve commitment problems (if any) to follow up the
agent's recommendation by attracting a third party, such as an outside in-
vestor. Profit-sharing with this party allows the principal, who cares about
neL profits, to align his incentives before and after the agent's nroject pro-
pusal. 7'he. contrac.l. can be de.wigned such 41raL it.s priu~ is equal to t,he ex-
pected return stream, so that commitment problems can be cosLleasly solvexl.
'1'he principal-agent model studied in this paper is relatively sirnple, and
can be used as a building block for models to investigate more complex issues.
For instance, in De Bijl [4], I study strategic delegation of responsibility
in firms competing on a product market. The firms' managers compete
by simultaneously giving their subordinates discretion to select (horizontal)
product location. A subordinate produces the good that is subsequently sold
by his manager.
The agency relationship o[ my model (in which the agent cares about
his private benefits) and the standard principal-agent model (with monetary
incentive schemes) are two extreme cases. An interesting generalization of the
rnodel, outside the scope of this paper, would be to endogenize the principal's
choice between giving the agent intrinsic or extrinsic rewards, and to analyze




"ft~is appendix aims at developing some intuition for the kind oC agency rela-
tionships to which the model applies. Consider the following model, adapted
from the main model: there is one possible project (say project I), and the
(risk-neutral) agent derives utility w if he receives a wage w 1 0. The cost of
getting informed is relatively high, so that the agent has no incentive to learn
his private benefits if he has no say in the project choice (assumption 3(i)).
Without any salary, A's optimal effort level is eo, resulting in expected
benefits uo, and profits IIr(eo) (the notation is defined in section 3). Suppose
that the profit or effort level is contractable. Then A can be induced to exert
effort e 1 eo if he is compensated with a payment scheme
w(~) u~ -[~lU(b, e) {- (1 - ar)U(b, e)], if Il - Ilr(e),
- p, otherwise.
P will select a payment scheme to implement an optimal effort level ac-
cording to
max IIr(e) - w(II)~, w~n~
s.t. w(II) - uo -(~iU(b, e) ~(1 - al)U(b, e)].
Assuming an interior solution, the optimal effort level e' that P wants to
implement satisfies
aII,(e') - 8U(6 e') 8U(6 e') I3
8e -al 8e
- ( 1 - ar) ae , ( )
accompanied by a wage w(IIr(e')) - uo - alU(b, e') -(1 -~r)U(b, e').
Suppose that P pays no wage. If al is amall, A's effort level will be low,
that is, eo will be relatively close to e. Moreover, if IIi(e) is relatively "flatn
atound eo, then there P can offer A only limited monetary compensation
for exerting more effort than eo. Thus, giving the agent a salary on top of
liis mservation wagc hardly increases profits at the optimurn ( and e' will
exceed eo only a little). To see this, observe the first-order condition (13).
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Ir í3n, (e')~8e tends to 0, we obtain the first-order condition that determines
~ ~~~
Nuw snppc~.tic I,hal. privatc benclits arc vcry iinport.anl. I,o Lhc agcnt, so
Ihat a high private-beuelits projeea iuduces n~lativc,ly high e(fort comparr'd
t.o eo, e and e'. [n particular, if A knows that 6r - b, then nr(è) ~ n~(e') -
w(nr(e')). Typically, there may exist a range of projects 1,... ,m such that
II;(è) ~ II1(e') - w(III(e')), for all i - 1,...,m,
and inducing a higher effort level than è by a wage scheme is hindered by
limited means (the profit function ia even flatter azound è). It will be cleaz
that in this case, appealing to the agent's senae of job satisfaction is much
more effective than using a monetazy incentive scheme.
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